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ABSTRACT 
 
The banking system growth through capitalisations in Nigeria produced some after-effects, both salutary and 
otherwise on the other financial institutions. The major objective of this paper was to find out the impact of the 
growth of the banking system on the OFIs. The paper adopted both primary and secondary data to assess the impact 
of the growth and regulation on the OFIs.  The paper adapted the Regulatory Pressure Index to assess the perception 
of regulation and supervision of the OFIs with granger causality and regressions and the main techniques of 
estimation. Banks have grown at the expense of the OFIs, especially the MFBs and PMIs. Of the OFIs the most 
negatively impacted have been the Finance Houses and Primary Mortgage Institutions. Growth in the banking 
assets has been more aggressive than from the OFIs and the various sectors have impacted one way or the other 
either negatively or otherwise.  A further investigation with primary data using the nine RPI objectives indicates 
that operators agree that there is inadequate supervision in the areas of capital adequacy, liquidity and products 
offerings of the OFIs. The paper concludes by recommending the change in the mode of supervision and the 
strengthening the Other Financial Institutions Department of the monetary authority or establishment of a new one 
to oversee and adequately regulate the activities of the OFIs. 
 
JEL Classification: G21; G28. 
 
Keywords: Regulation; Supervision; Finance Houses; Primary Mortgage Institutions (PMIs); Microfinance Banks; 
Regulatory Pressure Index (RPI). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Attention has been focused on bank financial institutions to the detriment of other financial institutions that make 
up the total bank and non-bank financial system, this, understandably with the size and the significant roles being 
played by the banks in the aggregate economy.  So much focus has been on the banks as if they only constitute the 
financial system and are in total control of the dynamics of the economy. This misplaced opinion has caused the 
issues of bank financial institutions to be considered as main arrow heads for the development of the economy, the 
empowerment and improvement of the lives of the people. While no doubt exists as to the role being played by 
the banks in the economy as far as their intermediation functions are concerned, the attention being focused on the 
sector can be detrimental to the performance and the effectiveness of other subsectors of the financial system, 
especially the non-bank deposit taking institutions. Also no doubt exist that when large banks fail a substantial 
amount of resources are lost and many micro units are negatively affected. The establishment of these institutions 
were for the development and the improvement of the sectors they were meant to finance. Financial institutions of 
various types exist to intermediate funds within various sectors given their level of risks and peculiarities. Gorton 
and Winton (2002) discusses the role of the institutions in the intermediating process and their significance in the 
free market system in the saving – investment paradigm. Central banks in developing countries have focused on 
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the banking system growth and distress management to the detriment and chagrin of other sectors (Katircioglu et 
al., 2018). 
  
While it is understood that the economic and developmental efforts alone cannot be achieved by the banks, it is an 
established fact that the other non-bank thrift or deposit taking institutions have stakes in the economy and can aid 
the development of the potentials often overlooked by the deposit money banks. Banks generally intermediate 
funds between surplus and deficit units, so do the non-bank financial institutions (Cetorelli et al, 2012) and nothing 
has changed much, but for channels of delivery. The weight attached to the Deposit Money bank firms tends to 
leave the other firms out of the purview of the regulators, or at best not much of focus is on them in the supervision 
process. These institutions are mainly the Finance Houses (FHs), Microfinance banks (MFBs) and Primary 
Mortgage Institutions (PMIs). By the neglect or passive regulation these institutions are receiving, two effects are 
noticeable. One, the non-effectiveness of their operations and inability to achieve the desired objectives set for 
them by the financial system. This has often made them derail and shift focus to non-objectives. A second effect 
is the rampant failures regularly experienced by these institutions. The failures have led to a general belief that 
thrift institutions and other non-bank firms cannot be profitable and at the same time intermediate well. The long 
run survival and performance of these institutions will not only help the economy in terms of employment and 
other issues, but also improve the sectors they are meant to service. 
 
With the unwieldy structures banks have assumed during the era of universal banking, the banking firm’s services 
can be divided into approximately 25 different sections (KPMG, 2013). Given the fact the universal banking seems 
to be out favour of most financial systems, the financial institutions acquired and managed by these banks are now 
being separated from the banks in a new wave of banking structure being adopted worldwide. This study becomes 
important at this time to enable the OFIs and non-bank deposit taking institutions to take firm and rooted stand 
and be impactful in the area of operations rather than being overshadowed by the banking system or rather being 
an appendage to them. The position of the banks, whether they are bank financial and bank non-financial controlled 
is established as far as credit allocation is concerned in the economy. This is mainly because of the power of 
deposit acquisition and seeming liquidity. The introduction of universal banking made the financial system more 
challenging for non-banking markets as banks could not directly differentiate between carving niches and 
specialising, preferring to open up in all markets. The main segments of universal banking being insurance, 
securities and retail banking were fully operated by the banks in spite of insufficient of resources to cater for the 
risks being encountered in each of the sectors. Thus an average bank opened or acquired a Primary Mortgage 
Institutions (PMIs), a capital market arm, an insurance firm and still remained a bank.  
 
The role being performed by the other financial institutions (OFIs) is apposite when the economy is developing 
and a larger percentage of the people are poor as subsist in many developing countries. The OFIs are known to be 
particularly useful for supplementing the role of the banks, create more competitive environment in the financial 
system and generally make the banks more efficient (Shrestha, 2007). The role of the OFIs have increased with 
the growing pension sector that is aggregating funds at an high rate though the market is immature in the very 
sense of the word. The market for financial products by the consumers is also growing. These are the areas where 
the OFIs should remain vibrant and strong, but these areas have been taken over by the banks. The main areas of 
the banks should rather be the corporate sectors and small and medium enterprises.  Sellon (1992) emphasises the 
role of the pension and mutual funds in the delivery of the financial services given their seeming closeness to the 
people. The main objective of this paper is to discover the relevance of the OFIs within the current structure and 
framework and the need to bring adequate regulation and supervision that has been made available to the banks in 
order to fulfil the role expected of them. To do this, the paper is divided into five sections. Following after this 
introduction is a brief review of the significance of OFIs, regulation and other issues. The third section centres on 
measurement of the variables used and methodology and the fourth is on the discussion of results and the expected 
impacts while the final section concludes the paper with recommendations.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A complex vortex of policies and actions bring financial intermediation to a point where the dynamics regularly 
introduce new paradigms into the financial system. The role of financial intermediation is being regularly redefined 
with continuous changes to a section or many sections of the finance industry. Earlier theories have argued the 
importance of either money or credit in the growth of the economy through financial market intermediation Levine 
(2000) believes there are four sides to which an economy development may tilt, one being the financial services. 
The competition existing between banks and other financial firms has reached a height that banks over the years 
have become weaker in most developed economies. Beim (1992) argues that traditional banks are dying while the 
other financial institutions are becoming stronger, more relevant and undercutting the banking firms businesses. 
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For instance, shadow banking is a becoming more significant than before. This was followed by counterarguments 
by Kaufman and Mote (1994). Somehow the other financial institutions (Thrift Institutions in the US) have grown 
stronger and are able to completely compete with the Banks offering services more readily and cheaply.  
 
Two institutions particularly analogous to those of the Nigerian financial environment: the finance houses and 
primary mortgage institutions both providing consumer finance and mortgages services respectively.  OFIs are all 
involved in intermediary role in finance and are purportedly closer to the households from whom much of the 
savings in the financial system come from. Over the years, through regulatory capital increases and capital 
adequacy policies, banks have suddenly grown to emasculate other financial institutions and have taken over the 
services rendered by these institutions. The bulk of domestic savings come from the various economic units 
particularly the households and Levine et al (2000) prove that OFIs contributes to domestic economic development 
of their respective countries. In most developed countries traditional banking has been on the decline which 
emphasises the leading and important role for OFIs. Edwards and Mishkin (1995) prove the importance of the 
TSIs in the United States over the traditional banking system and calls for their regulation to be stepped up. While 
the entrance of banking firms into the trading market through the universal banking system has produced risks and 
instability, the engagement of OFIs in the provision of services traditionally and conventionally undertaken by 
them enable them to develop business practices that suit the environment they service. Boot and Ratnoviski (2013) 
conclude that universal banking was inherently and dynamically risky for the banks by veering into trading 
activities as a result of the available short term opportunities. 
 
The vista of opportunities available to the OFIs to engage in consumer finance efforts is dimmed by the bigger 
banks that have seized the domestic financial market to maximise their investment. The OFIs can compete 
effectively against the Banks by introducing financial products with lower cost for the welfare of the population, 
subject to the regulators’ approval.  Lovati (1975) had brought out the products in which the Banks were dominant 
and the opportunities available for the OFIs to exploit and compete effectively with the Banks. The banks generally 
are disadvantaged in the pricing of products because of their expensive profile and other regulatory requirements. 
Reserve requirements of the Banks are rigorously implemented unlike the OFIs. Also, the OFIs can offer products 
that bring in cheapest sources of funds in form. Primary Mortgage Institutions (PMIs), Microfinance Banks 
(MFBs), Discount and Finance Houses (FHs) all have similar products that can compete with the conventional 
current accounts of the banks. The OFIs also have the advantage of personal touch at lower levels of the 
economically active persons. 
 
Regulation as a key issue in the financial services industry constitutes a barrier to entry. Both the banks and other 
financial institutions are regulated since their instrument of trade is the wealth of the people. While most economies 
have devolved the regulation to a single regulator or a modified form of it and not directly linked with the monetary 
authorities, the Nigerian economy still practises multiple regulators with central bank as the leading authority. 
Adetiloye (2008) calls for the adoption of regulation separated from the monetary authority using a modified form 
of single financial regulation. There are contentions that banks are overregulated making their services expensive, 
while issues of “Too big to fail banks” (TBTF) that survive on public sustenance rage on (Moosa, 2010). An 
attempt to increase the Tier 1 equity requirements of the PMIs is being seen with the effect to reduce the number 
of participating firms. Much unlike Nigeria, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) deals with the supervision and 
regulation of Thrift Institutions. It basic functions span the registration and ensuring that they follow laid down 
guidelines and fair competition. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) in United Kingdom as a single financial 
system regulator concerns itself with products fairness, pricing in the financial system and consumer protection 
while at the same time ensuring that the system is not available to those who would want to use it to perpetrate 
crime or commit fraud (Brauilt, 2002). Various reports have cited that less than half OFIs render returns (The 
Guardian, 2008) after being brought into the audit of the Central bank (The Punch 2009) and with explicit deposit 
insurance from the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (The Punch, 2007).  This has not changed much 
(NDIC, 2012). 
 
The conclusion is that while the OFIs are expected to increase in significance and the banks dwindle in influence, 
the banks have rather increased in power. The issue bring to fore the role of financial intermediaries in the 
economy, with the early belief that they are value creating and cost reducing. The gamut of regulations and 
dynamics of the financial system and market especially with the developments in information technology, 
deregulation, deepening of financial markets, tending to reduce transaction costs and information asymmetries, 
financial intermediation theory may come to the conclusion of irrelevance in the financial markets (Scholtens and 
van Wensveenshall, 2003).  Vittas (1995) concludes that active  peer monitoring and enforcement of contractual 
obligations are the best way forward if the other financial intermediaries must survive and thrive in the developing 
world. The Nigeria scenario of OFIs shows that the investors have always moved to benefit from loosely regulated 
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financial environments that have always ended up with the clients in these firms losing their deposit or investments. 
At different times as revealed by Figures 1 and 2 many of these institutions that were established have closed down 
with depositors sustaining losses. The heights of FHs and PMIs were in 1993 - 1996. These have tended to draw 
people close to the banking firms where ostensible deposit insurance subsists.  
 
 
       Source: Authors’ calculations  as adpated from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2015) 
 
Figure 1. 
Relationship between the Growth in Finance Houses, Microfinance Banks and PMIs 
 
The banks investment in the MFBs and PMIs are not significant enough to draw inference that their involvement 
has had positive effect on this set of OFIs. Two banks have wholly owned MFBs subsidiaries while seven other 
MFBs have investment of less than 30% from the Banks (NDIC, 2010).  
 
 
      Source: Authors’ calculations  as adpated from CBN Statistical Bulletin (2015) 
Figure 2. 
No of Financial Institutions in the System 1991- 2014 
 
The OFIs are supervised by a section in the CBN that collates reports that are submitted for analysis as to 
performance. This seems to be where the whole exercise ends.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The paper adopts a twofold technique to deal with the issue of impact perception and regulation challenges of the 
OFIs. A primary data was obtained using the metrics developed by KPMG (2013). Nine of the ten metrics were 
adapted to be tested in the case of the OFIs, though they were originally meant for the Deposit money banks. The 
Regulatory Pressure Index (RPI) as measurements was used to assess the regulatory impacts on the banking system 
in consideration of the improvements that have come into the system. Though, all the reference points have not 
been adopted by the CBN for the banking system, its use in this paper ensures that a global standard is used to 
measure financial institutions. It becomes useful especially to measure the perceptions of the operators’ of the 
supervisory and regulatory functions expected to be performed by in the running of the firms. 
 
A proper comparison of the stance of the banks requires a measurement of the banks regulatory impact using the 
above metrics. Four banks were selected at random as a sample of the 23 in the banking system. Two of the banks 
were established in the post-Structural Adjustment Programme of 1986, while the other two were established 
before 1952. The mean difference using t test for the bank produced a result of 4.065. This was used further on in 
the test for each of the OFIs. The secondary data source is the Central Bank of Nigerian Statistical Bulletin 2015 
from 1992 – 2014. The primary data consist of the Likert scale questionnaire ranging on scale of 5 to 1. The 
questionnaires were distributed to the available members of the OFIs and the managers of the branches of these 
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institutions that could be accessed on a convenient sampling basis. The number of OFIs covered was 3 namely, 
the primary mortgage institutions, finance houses and Microfinance banks. Appendix 1 shows the different OFIs 
and the total capitalisation in comparison with the banks. The questionnaire is to the intent of the operators’ 
perception of the adequacy of supervision of the OFIs.  
 
Table 1. Regulatory Pressure Index 
 
 Reforms Objectives 
1 Capital Increase both the quantity  and quality of capital buffers in order to reduce the 
possibility  of failures 
2 Liquidity Ensure that financial institutions have enough liquid assets to meet a potential 
run on funds. 
3 Products offering  Reduce risks to financial stability, from the structure of the financial services 
sector or the failure of a systemically important financial institution. 
4 Supervision Ensure that OFIs are properly supervised, proportionately to the nature, size 
and complexity of their business. 
5 Board Competence Ensure that Boards have sufficient skills, experience and availability to assume 
full accountability for the decisions taken by the organization. 
6 Remuneration Regulate excessive  remuneration practices 
7 Customer Treatment Protect the customer, help the customer make informed investment decisions 
and ensure that the products sold to the customer suit his/her investment 
profile. 
8 Quality of Financials Ensure that Accounts presented are reliable and can be compared across 
industry. 
9 Accounting and 
Disclosure Objectives 
Consider whether accounting policies need to be revised and the additional 
disclosures that may be required 
Move to expected loss provisioning. 
Source: Adapted from KPMG (2013)  
 
Table 2. Questionnaire Distribution and Retrieval 
 
Institutions Banks Primary Mortgage Inst. Microfinance Banks Finance Houses 
Average 
Reporting 
24 % 98 % 823 % 104 % 
No Served 6 28.57 35 35.71 35 4.25 32 30.77 
No 
Retrieved 
4 19.04 35 35.71 33 4 30 28.84 
Source: Authors’ Questionnaire Distribution 
 
The second stream of data is secondary and sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin 
2012.They are the numbers of other financial institutions reporting, the assets of the institutions in each category 
and thereby their growth rate was established. This is presented in the appendix. The techniques of estimation of 
the secondary data are granger causality and vector autoregressive processes. This is to show that massive growth 
of the banks and its impact on other financial institutions. The variables are first correlated to discover the 
relationships between them. Then granger causality is adopted to measure the causality of dwindling fortunes of 
the OFIs. Causality relates to the ability of one variable to predict the (and therefore cause) the other (Asteriou and 
Hall, 2011). Granger (1969; 1986) developed a VAR model that expresses both unidirectional and bi-directional 
feedback relationship between two variables tY  and tX .  
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Where yte  and xte  are uncorrelated error terms. The direction of causality of tY  and tX  could results in any of 
four causes: bi-directional causality and a unidirectional pairwise causality (Asteriou and Hall, 2011). To obtain a 
fit we test with the normal Wald F- statistic on coefficient restriction as follows: 
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Which follows the Fm,n-k distribution and K = m+n+1. Should the computed F-value exceed the F-critical value, 
the null hypothesis is rejected and concludes that tX   cause tY . Rssu and RssR represents sum of squared residual 
from the unrestricted and restricted equations respectively. Since causality results are not signed the need to 
introduce a superior technique becomes important to see the signs of the results and impact of the independent on 
the dependent variables. To estimate the impact of the growth of Bank assets on the OFIs institutions the study 
estimates a regression with the variables measured in percentages as growth of the assets in current year over the 
next i.e.  %ΔX = (X2 - X1)/X1. Bearing in mind the practicality of monetary aggregates on the institutions, the 
paper adopts the M1 and M2 approach being new money or cash and including current account deposits within the 
financial system. The result is then adopted for each of the banks and the other financial institutions as the system 
of variables. The study specifies that:  
 
BANKTA1 f α0 + β1M1+ β2 FHTA+ β3PMITA +β4MFBTA + ɛ ……………………….………………..(4) and an 
alternative to test the impact of M2 as 
 
BANKTA2 f α0 + β1M2 β2 + FHTA+ β3PMITAβ4 + MFBT + ɛ …..……….………………………… …(5) 
 
FHTA f α0 + β1BANKTA+ β2PMITA+ β3M1+ β4MFBTA+ ɛ ………………………..…………..…… (6) 
 
PMITA f α0 β1FHTA+ β2BANKTA+β3M1+ β4MFBTA + ɛ …………………………………...……… (7) 
 
MFBTA1 f α0 + β1PMITA +β2FHTA + β3M1+ β4BANKTA+ ɛ …………..…………………………….(8) 
 
MFBTA2 f α0 + β1PMITA+ β2FHTA+ β3M2+ β4BANKTA + ɛ …………………………………………(9) 
 
where:  BANKTA is growth in the banks’ assets: The same measurement were repeated for the Other Financial 
Institutions(OFIs) under test: PMI, MFB, FH. M1 represents cash and M2 represents cash and demand deposits. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The results are set out beginning with correlations indicating relationships, causality and regressions. Thus the 
results indicate the degree of relationships and impacts of the various financial institutions one against the other. 
In this order banks growth predominance and impact on the growth of the OFIs becomes plausible to accept. 
 
One very important observation of the result is the fact that the correlation of the average size of the each of the 
institutions does not have any relationship apart from the Finance houses and the banks. The finance firms had 
grown considerably in the early 1990s. With the correlation matrix in Table 3, there is only one significant 
relationship as expressed between the pair of microfinance banks and the PMIs which is negative at r -0.6.  Other 
relationships are as low as r 0.077 for PMIs and Banks growth. However, the relationships are all show positive 
though insignificant. This is expected as a result of the money supply and economic growth. A noteworthy 
observation in the results is the negative signs that most of the rs have in the pairs with the BANKTA variable 
except for the MFBs. The relationship is negative for the Microfinance and Finance houses subsector with rs of.-
189 and.-105 respectively.  A fair inference on this is that the growth of banks assets has somehow has negative 
relationship with the other financial institutions in the financial system. 
 
The significant Wald statistics for each of the pair of variables is indicated by the p values and are flagged.  The 
results show that there is significant bi-directional relationship between M2 and bank total assets which is not 
unexpected. This is because the most assets of the banks are a build-up of the current account deposits and cash. 
A test of the BANKTA and M1 indicating he cash in the economy also indicates a high significance. In essence 
the banks seem to have more of the cash in the economy than the OFIs. Other significant results which are 
somehow surprising are intra the sector of the OFIs, namely the PMIs, FHs, and MFBs showing that they have 
significant relationship inducing or granger causing the growth of each other. The most significant to the test is 
the bi-directional flow between the FHTA and PMITA with the FHTA bearing a lower significant level than 
between FHTA and PMITA. This simply means that more funds have flown into the PMIs sector than have the 
other way round. This means the PMIs have had more funds into them from the FHs.  
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Table 3. Correlation Analysis 
 
Sample (adjusted): 1993 2013     
Included observations: 21 after adjustments    
Correlation      
t-Statistic BANKTA  FHTA  M2  M1  MFBTA  PMITA  
BANKTA  1.000000      
 -----       
       
FHTA  0.249025 1.000000     
 1.120781 -----      
       
M2  0.796193 0.484764 1.000000    
 5.736008 2.415879 -----     
       
M1  0.634076 0.275812 0.499717 1.000000   
 3.574267 1.250754 2.514714 -----    
       
MFBTA  -0.041917 0.513947 0.278875 0.112556 1.000000  
 -0.182874 2.611547 1.265808 0.493758 -----   
       
PMITA  0.034801 -0.026662 0.008409 -0.060091 0.566744 1.000000 
 0.151788 -0.116257 0.036653 -0.262403 2.998417 -----  
Source: Output of Data from the derived variables  
 
Table 4. Abridged Granger Causality Results 
 
Sample: 1992 2014  
Lags: 2   
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
 FINTA does not Granger Cause BANKTA  20  0.45018 0.6459 
 BANKTA does not Granger Cause FHTA  2.17677 0.1479 
 M2 does not Granger Cause BANKTA  20  2.19112 0.1463 
 BANKTA does not Granger Cause M2  5.15870 0.0197 
 M1 does not Granger Cause BANKTA  19  8.45609 0.0039 
 BANKTA does not Granger Cause M1  1.31660 0.2993 
 MFBTA does not Granger Cause FHTA  20  7.99482 0.0043 
 FHTA does not Granger Cause MFBTA  3.61271 0.0524 
 PMITA does not Granger Cause FHTA  20  13.5002 0.0004 
 FHTA does not Granger Cause PMITA  3.28683 0.0655 
 M1 does not Granger Cause M2  19  29.9622 9.E-06 
 M2 does not Granger Cause M1  3.83949 0.0468 
 PMITA does not Granger Cause MFBTA  20  3.50221 0.0565 
 MFBTA does not Granger Cause PMITA  2.88813 0.0869 
Source: Authors Output of the Variables 
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The second bi-directional flow between the FHTA and MFBTA also show significant result that show FHTA is 
lower than the MFBTA that is the more increase in assets from the FHs than the MFBs. In this case again it is 
concluded that the PMIs have an upper hand. The FHs have had a decreased assets level from the other OFIs from 
this result. The PMIs have had a better increase in assets from the other two OFIs than the PMIs by the level of 
significance. Thus the FHs have the poorest showing of the three.  
 
The reason for this is obvious as most of the banks have acquired or invested heavily in PMIs in the bid to diversify 
their assets and invest their seeming surplus equity from the capitalisation exercise concluded in 2006. Single 
direction causality is observed between the Finance Houses and banks on one hand and bank assets and Finance 
House on the other. Also, the result of the causality between finance houses and PMIs is also significant. This 
relationship is bi-directional. While the result may indicate that the growth of one causes the other it may also 
indicate the fact the growth of one impact negatively against the other. The market situation between the PMIs and 
Finance houses in Nigeria show that the two, though different largely by nomenclature, invariably operate in the 
same market, with the PMIs offering products and services where the Finance house should predominate. PMIs 
selectively sell and their mortgage products with care avoiding possible default risk. The basic reason adduced for 
this scenario is the perennial and traditional problem of liquidity affecting the sub-sector. 
 
From result, it is observable that the impact of the growth in the assets of the banks is evident in the growth of 
current accounts and cash coming into the financial market.  Both theM1 and M2 have very high impact and 
positively so for the banks increase in assets. Both are beyond 0.01 levels of significance. However a significant 
negative impact beyond 0.01 levels is exerted by the MFBs in the regression of the BANKTA with whereas the 
PMITA have an equally significant impact on the BANKTA with M2 beyond the 0.10 levels while without M2 is 
close to being significant at t 1.5. With these results the impact of current accounts in the financial system becomes 
clear. The ts for the MFBTA is however stronger than the PMITA. This is likely indicating than the positive impact 
of the PMITA is weaker than the negative impact of the MFBTA. The FHTA shows that the PMITA is negatively 
impactful on the assets of the FHTA beyond 0.05 levels of significance while the MFBTA is indicating a positive 
impact and at a much stronger level. The output from the PMITA shows that the MFBTA have highly positively 
impacted the PMIs though why this is so cannot be immediately seen. At a level beyond 0.01 the MFBTA is 
strongly impactful on the PMITA. The impact of BANKTA on the PMITA is also nearly equally to FHTA. The 
positive t is not significant but higher than what is reported in FHTA at 1.5015.  As expected the M1 is also 
negatively insignificant. The PMIs even with the Negotiated Order of Withdrawal (NOW) some are operating is 
not sufficient for a positive output.  A significant impact is observed from FHTA at a level beyond 0.05. This 
seems to be the inverse of the impact from the PMITA to FHTA as initially observed above as both are at the same 
level. The Table below show the complete results. The sector appears to be the most resilient as it is impacting 
more on the other sectors. 
 
Table 5. Regression Output of the Models 
 
 Variables BANKTA1 BANKTA2 FHTA PMITA MFBTA1 MFBTA2 
Constant  8.365426 3.265756 -40.5022 -9.98238 24.4213 15.29571 
  (1.23407) (0.74694) (-0.9642) (-0.1900) (1.006828) (0.767735) 
BANKTA   2.076718 2.605704 -1.42072 -2.389904 
    (1.450784) (1.501589) (-1.76108) (-2.5366)** 
M1 0.820667  -0.52195 -2.42183 1.173366  
  (3.378)***  (-0.27015) (-1.06307) (1.084518)  
M2  1.015456    2.52814 
   (6.4370)***    (2.13403)** 
FINTA 0.055980 0.012903  -0.60682 0.391908 0.296388 
  (1.450784) (0.451862)  (-2.3002)** (3.6795)*** (2.70573)** 
MFBTA -0.114284 -0.114888 1.169512 1.516494   
  (-1.76108)* (-2.5366)** (3.6795)*** (4.1641)***   
PMITA 0.047402 0.042462 -0.40952  0.342956 0.34260 
  (1.501589) (1.914386)* (-2.3002)**  (4.1641)*** (4.60471)*** 
        
R Squared 0.508690 0.750755 0.504726 0.526282 0.666036 0.712990 
Adj R Sqd 0.385863 0.692109 0.380908 0.407852 0.582545 0.645458 
F Stat 4.141505 12.80148 4.076344 4.443841 7.977344 10.55785 
D W 1.515923 1.841128 2.242931 1.817023 2.447629 1.930181 
Observations 21 22 21 21 21 22 
Source: Regression Outputs from the Data 
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Lastly, MFBTA output also show a relationship of positive impact from PMITA as earlier reported. These two 
OFIs are not directly competing, though in the same industry. This impact is positively significant as before. In 
addition the positive impact of the FHTA is also observed thereby validating the earlier results with FHTA. Both 
are significant beyond 0.01 levels.  
 
M1 is positive but insignificant, clearly indicating that the MFBs assets have not been increased by the available 
cash in the economy, though there is tendency to believe that the informal sector that MFBs are to cater for are 
main holders of cash resources that should be in the banking system. A negatively insignificant impact also exist 
between from the BANKTA to MFBTA much unlike a high negative significant impact at 0.01 levels from the 
MBFTA to the BANKTA. The MFBs and Banks do complete no doubt to a less degree for current accounts 
deposits. Thus the M2 version of the regression is more meaningful. 
 
The coefficients indicate a negatives trend in both the FHTA and PMITA with higher figure for FHTA. The two 
sets of institutions are definitely on the decline when compared with the Banks. BANKTA shows less impact than 
MFBTA while MFBTA indicates a stronger growth. The overall fit for the regressions show that the BANKTA 
has the greatest fit of all the models. With R2 at 0.75 it shows that this model less than 0.25 is out of the growth 
within the financial system. This is observed have been made possible form the growth in monetary aggregates 
and negative contribution form the MFBTA. FHTA show that R2 is just about 0.5 and adj. R2 at 0.38. The fit is 
just acceptable and not totally convincing. The case of the PMIs indicates almost a similar, nonetheless, a better 
result than FHTA, while the total fit of the MFBTA is much better but not as good as BANKTA at R2 of .071 the 
result is more plausible than the previous two. With the benchmark of F. Stat of 3.939 (F. 23, 6), regression 
estimates are significant beyond 0.01 levels. In all the regressions the DW is acceptable but for the BANKTAi 
 
The secondary data reveals that the monetary authorities have not done so much for the OFIs sector, concentrating 
on the bank finance sector. The metrics for various RPI objectives shows dismal negative values with the aver6age 
for the FHs recording the highest negative t values and overall average of t -13.41 with its highest of t -23.18 in 
disclosure objectives. From every indication they are not supervised in this area. Its best (least) negative result is 
the areas of customer satisfaction which of course shows that they are have developed close relations with many 
of the clients or customers while many have switched over to the banks for patronage. Capital adequacy is next in 
term of supervision with t -19.04 indicating that they are not regulated in this area. The mean difference of the data 
is more revealing because of the adopted Banks metric and mean difference of t 4.065. From this mean disclosure 
objectives is highest with -2.589 followed by adequate supervision -2.446. Operators here believe they are not 
adequately supervised or regulated.  
 
Table 6 .Abridged Results of One Sample t test for the three OFIs 
 
  Finance House Microfinance Banks Primary Mortgage Institutions 
Objectives 
t Df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Differe
nce 
t Df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Differen
ce 
t Df 
Sig. 
(2-
taile) 
Mean 
Differenc
e   
CAPADQ -19.04 29 0 -2.398 -10 32 0 -2.429 -4.33 34 0 -1.065 
LDTY -11.12 29 0 -2.208 -10.2 32 0 -2.474 -14.8 34 0 -2.52 
PRDTFRG -14.47 29 0 -2.113 -17.1 32 0 -2.792 -13.3 34 0 -2.383 
ADQTSPV -13.93 29 0 -2.446 -10.5 32 0 -2.292 -7.96 34 0 -1.701 
BRDCPCE -6.336 29 0 -1.113 -5.65 32 0 -1.565 -3.51 34 0.002 -1.02 
RNMTN -13.79 29 0 -2.255 -11.5 32 0 -2.474 -8.05 34 0 -1.974 
DSFDCST -6.299 29 0 -0.684 -5.2 32 0 -1.52 -2.91 34 0.008 -0.792 
FNRQLT -12.49 29 0 -2.017 -9.79 32 0 -2.338 -4.05 34 0.001 -1.065 
DSCOBJ -23.18 29 0 -2.589 -11.4 32 0 -2.565 -9.53 34 0 -1.974 
Source:  Summary Results of Primary Data Collected by the authors (2013): Test Value for Banks = t 4.065 
 
The MFBs record a slightly better output with the negative t averaging at t -10.1. It has the least negative t (best 
result) in customer satisfaction with t -5.2 and its worst result in the product offerings with t -17.1. This shows 
there is lack of imagination in their product offerings. Remunerations control is the next poorest at t -11.5 which 
indicates that there are few controls on earning of officials. It is hardly surprising that board competence records 
a second lowest t of -5.65 with the ownership of MFBs coming mainly from the retired bankers and persons who 
could not obtain license to operate banks due to the capital requirements barrier. The means difference for each of 
the objectives is also slightly better than the FHs. The average mean of -1.52 is better than the FHs at -2.589. This 
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is where the bank measures 4.065. The PMIs seem to have the best results somehow, and show that the regulation 
perception of the RPI objectives measure better on the average t with -7.6. It is worst result is in liquidity with t of 
-14.8 and next worst is product offering with -13.3 followed by disclosure objectives with t of -9.53. It is clear that 
the perception of the operators concerning the observation cannot be more correct since the liquidity crises which 
the subsector can face if not carefully managed can engulf the subsector. This is perhaps why the product offering 
is poor: most PMIs compete outside their main area of providing mortgage finance and other similar services.  
 
The mean result of the PMIs shows an average of -1.61. This is slightly close to the MFBs. Means difference show 
that the customer satisfaction is perhaps best in the PMIs with the lowest -0.792. Financial record quality and 
capital adequacy is next with -1.065. The worst result is shown by liquidity and product offerings with means of -
2.52 and -2.383 respectively. Overall the PMIs results seem to respond to better interaction with regulators. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
One observation of the whole study is that little attention is paid to the OFIs with much attention being paid the 
banks.  The OFIs therefore need adequate attention from the regulators. It behoves on the authorities to ensure that 
the level of soundness that exist in the banking system be transmitted to the OFIs for the smooth running of the 
financial market. With this observation it may not be possible for the Other Financial Institutions Department 
(OFID) of the Central Bank of Nigeria as presently constituted to perform the regulatory functions. The department 
should either be reconstituted or be taken up by another separate regulator for better and more effective 
performance of the sector. It is clear that liquidity is a key issue in the OFIs from the results and the perception of 
the operators. The problem can be overcome by increase in equity capital requirements of the institutions in each 
sub-sector. With an increased equity capital the institutions can be more confident in the market and can have 
cushion for risks that are undertaken. This will also bring confidence to the system for customers and clients to 
patronise them with no fear of losing their deposits or placements. The downside effect of this would be the 
reduction of numbers of operators. When raising capital becomes difficult it may be more sensible for the banks 
to acquire these firms, especially the FHs where any value can be obtained. With the new structure being 
implemented in the banking industry, OFIs, especially the FHs face bleak future if nothing is done. 
 
Products offerings and disclosure are the other key areas that the OFIs need to improve on. Each firm must improve 
on products offerings and must be innovative to bring back the clients and customers that patronised them before 
the banking boom episode of 2004 - 2006. Sustainability of products offering can be ensured by adequate and 
close-marking regulation. The products must be market friendly for it to succeed. If, in Nigeria, banks have taken 
over the financial system through the acquisition of other financial institutions and the regulators of the other 
financial institutions seem powerless to change fortunes of the firms, then it is death to the FHs. The paper has 
investigated the effects of the growth in the banking industry in Nigeria on the OFIs. It is clear that that increase 
in capital in the post-universal banking regime can have the effect of   allowing banks to invest into other financial 
institutions. The effects have been both negative and positive on the Finance Houses, Primary Mortgage 
institutions and Microfinance subsectors. The impact on the Finance Houses has been negative as the Banks began 
to offer and sell products where the finance houses have been predominant before. There is also evidence that 
regulators and supervisors have not done much in the OFIs as the perception by operators show. The particular 
areas identified are capital adequacy, liquidity and products offerings. All these need to be improved. These would 
improve the OFIs subsector and the financial system in general.  
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